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 The literature on leadership suggests that the performance context of a
 succession event and the origin of a newly appointed leader moderate
 the relationship between the succession and its consequences for per-
 formance in large corporations. We tested that premise with data from
 477 large corporations and a measure of excess stock market returns.
 The findings show that investors are most favorably predisposed to
 successions in which outsiders are appointed to financially healthy
 firms.
 The scholarly and business worlds alike are giving increasing attention
 to executive accountability, partly because pressures from stockholder
 groups are mounting on this issue. Researchers, however, remain divided as
 to whether appointing a new leader influences the performance of a large
 organization. Some have found that leadership doesn't matter: a leader will
 not alter performance because organizations-particularly large ones-tend
 to run themselves (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972;
 Mintzberg, 1979). Thus, the replacement of a leader also will not matter;
 succession becomes ritual scapegoating (Gamson & Scotch, 1964). Others
 have found that leadership does matter (Weiner & Mahoney, 1981) but that
 the disruption that succession causes cancels the positive effect of replacing
 an unsuccessful manager (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986). Still other research-
 ers have argued that whether a new leader has a positive, neutral, or negative
 influence on performance depends on the match between the leader's char-
 acteristics and the job requirements (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick
 & Mason, 1984). However, subsequent studies have not uncovered a consis-
 tent set of contingent factors that explain when a positive succession-
 performance relationship will occur in large corporations (Beatty & Zajac,
 We are grateful to George Brower, Hugh O'Neill, and several anonymous journal reviewers
 for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.
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 1987; Friedman & Singh, 1987; Furtado & Rozeff, 1987; Lubatkin, Chung,
 Rogers, & Owers, 1986; Reinganum, 1985).
 There are at least three reasons, however, to investigate further the pos-
 sibility that executive succession can influence the financial performance of
 large organizations. First, compelling anecdotal evidence from the business
 world supports the position that leadership can make a difference in large
 organizations. For example, it is difficult to overlook the contributions of
 Jack Welch at General Electric, John Opel at IBM, and Lee Iacocca at Chrysler
 Corporation. Second, most studies have overlooked the presuccession per-
 formance of firms experiencing succession and failed to consider the origin
 of a successor in light of that context. Research on corporate turnaround
 (Hofer, 1980; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976) and on the causes of executive
 succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1985) has, however, recognized the importance
 of these two contingent factors, as did Hall (1987), who argued that a leader
 is important only in times of organizational crisis, change, and growth.
 Third, some of the ambiguity surrounding the succession-performance
 issue may originate in the way that financial performance is defined. Suc-
 cession studies have traditionally defined performance by an accounting-
 based measure such as return on assets or by a security market-based mea-
 sure such as abnormal returns. The finance literature, however, has devel-
 oped a strong case for using a security market measure called excess returns
 (Scholes & Williams, 1977). This measure overcomes the principal criticisms
 of the abnormal returns measure and grants researchers the advantages of
 using stock market data. Only recently have data files existed that allow
 researchers to adopt this measure in large-sample studies.
 The present study extended past research efforts by examining two fac-
 tors that are believed to be important determinants of succession and lead-
 ership effects: organizational context, in terms of presuccession perfor-
 mance, and successor's origin as an insider or as an outsider. Using a mul-
 tiple regression design, we simultaneously considered the independent and
 interactive effects of those two contingent factors while controlling for or-
 ganizational size. We calculated the dependent variable, excess returns, over
 various time horizons to distinguish between succession effects and longer-
 term leadership effects. Finally, a large data set (477 instances of appoint-
 ments) permitted a rigorous testing of hypotheses relating chief executive
 officer (CEO) succession to performance.
 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
 Performance Context
 Previous research has suggested that the performance of an organization
 before a leader's replacement is an important contextual factor. For example,
 organizational performance is a major determinant of executive tenure (Al-
 lan & Panian, 1982; James & Soref, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980), and
 executive replacement is a common response to poor financial performance
 (Brady & Helmich, 1984; Dalton & Kesner, 1985).
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 Strategic management and organization theory scholars have also as-
 serted that an organization's performance influences its adaptiveness (Bour-
 geois, 1981; Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983; Litschert & Bonham, 1978).
 Firms that can generate resources in excess of their needs to pay suppliers,
 develop markets, attract employees, fend off competitors' attacks, and oth-
 erwise engage in basic business activities have "slack." Slack gives an orga-
 nization the luxury of making decisions that are based on extensive infor-
 mation searches (Fredrickson, 1985), maintaining stability through intermit-
 tently good and bad times (Cyert & March, 1963), and attracting capital at
 low cost from the debt and equity markets (Porter, 1985). Slack may also
 foster creative behavior (Bourgeois, 1981), a motivated and committed work
 force (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984), and a culture that identifies with win-
 ning; opposite effects are expected in low-performance settings. In addition,
 the leaders of high-performing firms should perceive a wide array of invest-
 ment options and be granted great discretion in adjusting to environmental
 influences (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
 It is tempting to conclude that leaders who inherit a high-performance
 context have greater opportunity to affect future performance than leaders
 who inherit a low-performance context. However, low performance may also
 influence the adaptiveness of organizations, although the process is quite
 different. Low performance is associated with a sense of urgency and a
 departure from some desired status quo. Although managers may lack the
 time and resources for extensive information searches during times of low
 performance, their decisions may be at least as rational and have as much
 impact as those made in a high-performance context. As Cyert and March
 (1963) observed, poor performance pressures managers to make precise, dis-
 criminating decisions because they have little margin for error. Mintzberg,
 Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) noted that during times of high performance
 managers tend to direct attention to problems but are more casual with
 opportunities, which they assume can be exploited. Hall (1987) viewed both
 performance contexts as important.
 Two studies have examined the role of presuccession performance in
 explaining stock market reactions to succession events. Lubatkin and col-
 leagues (1986) found no relationship, and Friedman and Singh (1986) found
 (at the .10 level of significance) that when presuccession performance is
 poor, the market's reaction to succession tends to be positive. The two stud-
 ies share three potential research flaws. Both dichotomized the context vari-
 able into high- and low-performance categories rather than letting it remain
 continuous and thus lost information that may have borne on their results.
 They used as their dependent variable a short-term measure of abnormal
 return that may have failed to capture the full stock market reaction to the
 succession events. Finally, they failed to adequately account for another
 important contextual factor, organizational size.
 Given the drawbacks in past studies of the performance-context issue
 and the conflicting theories on the subject, we will again test the following
 general hypothesis:
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 Hypothesis 1: Holding size constant, the performance of a
 firm at the time of a succession event will affect the abil-
 ity of a newly appointed leader to influence future earn-
 ings.
 Successor Origin
 Previous research has also supported the existence of a linkage between
 the origin of a successor and firm performance. For example, during a small-
 sample field study, Kotter (1982) observed that outsiders who lacked a thor-
 ough understanding of the business that they were inheriting generally con-
 tributed less to their organizations than did insiders. Further, outsiders have
 a greater disruptive influence on an organization (Allen, Panian, & Lotz,
 1979), which may in turn produce negative outcomes like a decline in mo-
 rale and an increase in turnover (Grusky, 1964). Finally, an outside appoint-
 ment may signal the failure of a firm's human-capital-investment program to
 develop depth in its management ranks and therefore raise questions about
 the firm's ability to compete in the future (Furtado & Rozeff, 1987).
 As with performance context, the linkage between successor origin and
 future organizational performance remains conceptually appealing but em-
 pirically ambiguous. Lubatkin and colleagues (1986) and Friedman and
 Singh (1987) found that outside appointments produced significantly higher
 abnormal returns than inside appointments. Furtado and Rozeff (1987)
 found the opposite, and Beatty and Zajac (1987) found no distinction be-
 tween the two types of appointments. Reinganum (1985) found significant,
 positive abnormal returns only for outside appointments in small firms in
 which the announcement of the appointment coincided with the announce-
 ment of the departure of the former officeholder. None of these studies has
 explicitly accounted for the size of each firm studied, though all have rec-
 ognized that size is a potentially important covariate.
 In light of the inconsistent findings about successor origin,
 Hypothesis 2: Holding size constant, the origin of an ap-
 pointed successor will affect his or her ability to influence
 future earnings.
 Interactive Effects
 A contingency view of management succession suggests that whether a
 new leader has a positive, neutral, or negative influence on performance
 depends on how well the characteristics of the leader match the require-
 ments set by the context of a job (Fiedler, 1964; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984;
 Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Consistent with this view, we developed an ad-
 ditional hypothesis that recognizes that the different task demands associ-
 ated with high- and low-performing firms may require the different leader-
 ship influences associated with outside and inside appointments.
 A contingent relationship is expected for firms that are performing
 poorly at the time of a succession event. Previous research suggests that
 outsiders will be more able to turn such firms around than will insiders
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 (Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978; Schendel &
 Patton, 1976). Because insiders may have a limited perspective (Cyert &
 March, 1963), they are less able to deal with changes in an organization's
 environment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In contrast, outsiders have been
 associated with organizational adaptiveness and change since they have less
 commitment to an organization's strategies and values (Helmich, 1975; Pfef-
 fer, 1981). As a result, they are more likely to alter its mission, objectives,
 and strategy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
 The opposite contingent relationship is expected for high-performing
 firms. Because insiders are less disruptive to an organization than outsiders
 (Brown, 1982; Helmich, 1977), they may be more able than outsiders to
 maintain high performance.
 Hypothesis 3: The performance of a firm prior to a change
 in leadership and the origin of a successor moderate the
 relationship between executive succession and subse-
 quent earnings. Specifically,
 Hypothesis 3a: Outsiders will have a more positive im-
 pact on performance in low-performing firms than insid-
 ers will.
 Hypothesis 3b: Insiders will have a more positive impact
 on performance in high-performing firms than outsiders
 will.
 Organizational Size: An Extraneous Influence
 Many studies of leadership have recognized the importance that the size
 of an organization has for the ability of a leader to influence performance.
 For example, large organizations are associated with entrenched power
 structures that help to insulate top management from external pressures. As
 a result, it seems that large organizations are more likely than small ones to
 replace top managers from inside (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Furtado & Rozeff,
 1987) and more likely to minimize the influence that a new leader may have
 on corporate performance (Hall, 1987; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Although
 most succession studies have not established explicit controls for size, it
 follows that such controls are important. The studies by Furtado and Rozeff
 and by Reinganum established categorical controls by arbitrarily splitting
 their samples into two size groupings, large and small firms, and then pre-
 senting abnormal returns for each. A limitation with categorical controls is
 that they lose information that may have a bearing on the results. The present
 study controlled for the effects of size by including it as a continuously
 scaled independent variable in a multiple regression equation.
 METHODS
 Sources of Data
 An exhaustive list of firms in which a succession had taken place and
 the origins of the successors were identified from Forbes's annual June is-
 1989  51
 Academy of Management Journal
 sues about executive compensation. Because these issues list the 800 firms
 with the highest paid executives, the population is biased toward organiza-
 tions that believe in the importance of leadership, at least in so far as high
 salaries are evidence. Indirect support for this assertion comes from a study
 by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), who found compensation (salary plus
 bonus) to be significantly related to abnormal stock-price performance. We
 identified 1,187 CEO successions during the period 1971-85. We then ex-
 cluded CEO appointments where we could not clearly identify the first
 public announcement in the Wall Street Journal and all appointments in
 firms that made confounding announcements of major corporate events such
 as mergers, dividend changes, and capital expenditure plans during a two-
 month period (50 trading days) before the succession announcement (t - 50,
 t - 1). We used that criterion to control for the possibility that announce-
 ments of other events might bias findings attributed to an executive appoint-
 ment. The period over which we measured presuccession performance (de-
 scribed under Independent Variables) was also carefully screened for pos-
 sible takeover bids, succession events, and other major corporate events that
 might conceal the firms' long-term performance trends. Also, the appoint-
 ments made had to be lasting; we excluded firms that made a second CEO
 appointment during the 200 trading days after the succession event we were
 studying. In short, the general selection rule followed was to exclude a
 succession event if there was reasonable evidence of a potentially confound-
 ing event. A total of 573 cases remained. Of those, 505 met an additional
 requirement for inclusion which was that the firm be listed on the Center for
 Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Excess Returns Data File for a full
 300 trading days (approximately 15 months) before and after the succession
 announcement so that we could obtain estimates for the five dependent
 variables (see Time Frame) and the performance-context variable. A final
 criterion for inclusion had to do with determining the origin of the succes-
 sor: we excluded 28 cases from further investigation because the successor
 did not fall into either origin category (categories are described under Inde-
 pendent Variables). The final group therefore included 477 succession cases
 at 357 firms and represented 40 percent of the 1,187 cases identified in
 Forbes.1
 Dependent Variable: Excess Returns
 Given the limitations of accounting-based measures, researchers in
 management have given more attention to the use of capital market measures
 to evaluate the effect of events like management succession (Lubatkin &
 Shrieves, 1986). These measures are ex ante measures in that they reflect
 investors' expectations of future performance. As such, capital market mea-
 sures contrast with traditional accounting-based measures, which are ex
 post, reflecting historical performance patterns. Capital market measures
 1 Eight percent of the group were delisted from public listings between 14 and 60 months
 after the announcement of the CEO changes we studied.
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 assess the influence of an event on a firm's security (common stock) by
 estimating the normal, or expected, return to the stock in the absence of an
 event. The abnormal, or unexpected, return to the stock is the difference
 between its observed return and its expected return. Positive abnormal re-
 turns suggest that stockholder value is being created.
 Theoretically, abnormal returns represent an unbiased estimate of in-
 vestors' evaluation of the changes in future earnings that they expect because
 of some firm-specific event, such as a change in leadership, and not because
 of overall market movements. Thus, abnormal returns should be a strong
 surrogate for actual economic performance. In practice, however, the market
 model's ordinary-least-squares estimates of abnormal returns suffer from a
 potentially serious econometric problem. The problem results from nonsyn-
 chronous trading of securities: many securities are traded infrequently, and
 their prices are therefore only reported at distinct random intervals. This
 irregularity makes calculations of returns "for almost all securities biased
 and inconsistent" (Scholes & Williams, 1977: 310). To date, researchers have
 tolerated this bias because of computational difficulties associated with cor-
 recting for it.
 In 1983, CRSP made available a daily returns file that corrects for non-
 synchronous bias. For this file, called the Daily Excess Returns File, CRSP
 computes excess returns, or the unbiased analogues of abnormal returns,
 through a three-step procedure originally developed by Scholes and
 Williams (1977). First the Scholes-Williams beta, or systematic risk, is com-
 puted for each security using a three-day moving-average market window.
 Beta, or systematic risk, represents the sensitivity of a firm's returns to over-
 all stock market trends. The three-day moving average ensures against po-
 tential nonsynchronous trading problems (Brown & Warner, 1985). Next, on
 the basis of average annual betas, CRSP ranks all securities traded on the
 New York and the American Stock Exchanges into ten risk classes; the first
 contains securities with betas in the 90th percentile or higher, the second,
 securities with betas in the 80th to 89th percentiles, and so on. Finally,
 excess returns are computed for each firm for each day by (1) calculating the
 firm's one-day common stock return, which is change in price after adjust-
 ment for any stock splits or dividends, (2) identifying the risk class that most
 closely matches the firm's level of systematic risk, and (3) calculating the
 one-day portfolio returns of all firms in that risk class and then subtracting
 that return from the firm's stock return. The Appendix details this three-step
 procedure.
 In addition to correcting for nonsynchronous bias, excess returns use a
 superior benchmark, or control, to represent normal or expected returns.
 Whereas abnormal returns are calculated for each firm by comparing its
 returns to some market-wide adjusted average, excess returns compare a
 firm's returns only to the returns of firms in the market that have similar
 levels of systematic risk. To the extent that firms that have similar risk
 profiles are also similar along various dimensions that determine systematic
 risk and stockholder return, such as organizational size (Ben-Zion & Shelit,
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 1975), financial leverage (Hamada, 1972), cyclicality (Fabozzi & Francis,
 1979), and market power (Moyer & Chatfield, 1983), excess returns will
 better control for influences extraneous to research objectives than will ab-
 normal returns.
 All capital market measures, including excess returns, however, suffer
 from one shortcoming: they can only estimate the full impact of wholly
 unanticipated events. Succession events are not likely to be wholly unan-
 ticipated; indeed, we could argue that all leadership changes are partially
 anticipated, except, of course, those caused by the untimely death of an
 incumbent. This shortcoming, however, need not invalidate the use of mar-
 ket measures for hypothesis testing. First, early anticipation biases the re-
 sults against finding stock returns that differ in a statistical sense from their
 expected level, thus promoting a conservative test (Beatty & Zajac, 1987;
 Brown & Warner, 1985). Second cumulating excess returns over various time
 horizons surrounding an announcement day allows approximation of the
 impact of early investor awareness on stock returns. A later section discusses
 the issue of time frame and describes the horizons used in this study.
 Independent Variables
 The performance context of firms at the time of the succession events
 was approximated by cumulating their excess returns over 200 trading days
 (approximately 9.5 months), beginning 300 trading days before the first pub-
 lic announcement of an executive change. This period should be adequate to
 capture long-term trends in investors' expectations of future earnings and
 thus should approximate firm performance in the absence of a change in
 leadership. We excluded the 100 trading days immediately preceding the
 announcements to minimize the chance that the succession events them-
 selves would bias the context measures, which would be the case if investors
 anticipated events before their first public announcement. The validity of
 the context variable used in this study to represent the financial well-being
 of a firm at the time of the succession event can be gauged by observing the
 ratio of succession firms we studied with negative context measures -those
 performing less well than firms with similar risk-and those with positive
 context measures. Inasmuch as executive replacement is a common response
 to poor performance, a valid context measure should find most successions
 to be in poorly performing firms. Indeed, about 65 percent of the firms used
 in this study performed less well than firms with similar risk during the
 designated context period. A chi-square statistic significant to the .01 level
 suggested that the observed frequency of low-performing firms differed from
 what would be expected if below-market performance randomly occurred in
 the population.
 The origin of the successor CEO was determined in a straightforward
 categorical way with one provision: to avoid blurring the distinction be-
 tween insider and outsider, we designated an insider as a successor who had
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 at least five years of tenure with the firm in question and an outsider as a
 successor who had not been with the organization for more than one year
 before moving to the top. In virtually all cases, outsiders were brought di-
 rectly into the position of CEO. Thus, the definition used in this study
 represents extreme cases of outside appointments and is comparable to Van-
 cil's definition of recent outsider (1987: 262), rather than to his broader
 definition of outsider (1987: 56). We excluded cases that did not fall into
 either category from further investigation. Computationally, origin is a di-
 chotomous dummy variable defined as 0 if a successor was an insider and as
 1 if a successor was an outsider. We examined possible moderating effects of
 context and origin by including an interaction variable in the multiple re-
 gression model.
 A final independent variable, corporate size, was added to the regres-
 sion equation as a control variable. We measured size as a continuous inde-
 pendent variable, by calculating the logarithm of each firm's stock market
 capitalization (price per share times number of shares outstanding) on the
 last trading day of the year immediately preceding the year of a CEO ap-
 pointment. We also controlled size by limiting the population of succession
 cases to large organizations. Finally, we checked correlation of size with the
 other independent variables to determine if size was an important covariate.
 Time Frame: Selecting the Relevant Horizon Length
 If a change in CEO is viewed as a favorable indicator for future earnings,
 the market price of a firm's stock will increase as investors learn of a lead-
 ership change. The problem facing researchers is determining exactly when
 investors know all succession-related information (Malatesta & Thompson,
 1985). Studies in finance journals have tended to define the relevant suc-
 cession time frame as the announcement day plus the trading day preceding
 it (Furtado & Rozeff, 1987).
 Studies in management journals, however, have argued that the two-day
 announcement effect may not capture the full market evaluation of a suc-
 cession event (Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986; Reinganum,
 1985). For example, Reinganum discussed the possibility of information
 leaking to the marketplace before a change in leadership is officially made
 public. He also recognized the possibility of noninstantaneous investor re-
 actions occurring during the period after an announcement. For the current
 study, therefore, we cumulated excess daily returns over five different ho-
 rizons and then performed multiple regression analyses on each. Figure 1
 illustrates the five horizons.
 One horizon is the commonly used 2-day announcement period (t - 1,
 t = 0), in which t = 0 is the day of the first public announcement of a
 succession and t - 1 is the trading day immediately preceding the an-
 nouncement day. The results of such short-term analysis should capture
 investors' perceptions about the effects on a firm's future earnings of a suc-
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 FIGURE 1
 Various Time Horizons Surrounding Succession Announcements
 Presuccession Period Post-succession Period
 Performance Announcement
 Context Period Day
 -300 -100 -50 -1 0 +1 +50 +100 +300
 I ---1-|2-day succession effect
 |51-day presuccession effect
 50-day post-succession effect |
 101-day cumulative effect I
 200-day long-term leadership effect |
 cession event itself, rather than the anticipated effect of the newly appointed
 leader.
 The second horizon (t - 50, t = 0) is a period of about two and a half
 months (51 trading days) preceding and including an announcement day; it
 is designed to capture early market awareness of a leadership change. Al-
 though it was not possible to identify the precise date of market awareness
 for each firm, the time period examined here should be long enough to
 capture most succession-related information and short enough to avoid any
 serious bias from unrelated, firm-specific events.
 The third horizon (t + 1, t + 50) allowed us to examine excess returns
 during the two-and-a-half-month period immediately following an an-
 nouncement day. With the uncertainty resolved concerning if and when a
 leadership change will occur and who will be appointed, investors can re-
 evaluate their initial expectations about future earnings. Further, investors
 are likely to form their revised perceptions on the basis of a different set of
 factors, those that can only be known with certainty after the appointment of
 a new leader. This situation pertains particularly if investors did not antic-
 ipate who the new leader would be.
 The fourth horizon (t - 50, t + 50) covers the full 101 trading days
 surrounding and including an announcement day and allows cumulation of
 the returns for the second and third horizons.
 The final horizon (t + 100, t + 300) captures the performance of firms
 over a nine-and-a-half-month period beginning 100 trading days after a suc-
 cession announcement. This period should be adequate to capture long-term
 trends in investor expectations but be free of any residual succession effects.
 Further, the results for this horizon may best capture leadership effects be-
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 cause it approximates a period when a new leader is likely to make substan-
 tive changes in strategic and operational domains.
 Methods of Analysis
 A multiple regression equation for both the independent and interactive
 effects of the two contingent factors and the independent effects of corporate
 size on stockholder returns, the dependent variable, was developed in the
 following form: excess returns - f (context, origin, context x origin, size).
 Although the signs and magnitude of the regression coefficients are
 sufficient for testing the significance of the interaction between context and
 origin, they do not say much about the form of the contingency relationship.
 Specifically, the coefficients alone may not allow for clear inferences about
 when it is best to hire an insider and when an outsider. By segregating the
 firms by origin and by performance context, we pushed the analysis of the
 third hypothesis to a second stage. In order to dichotomize the context vari-
 able, we first ranked firms according to their context measure and then
 partitioned the ranking into approximate thirds. The high-performing third
 consisted of firms with positive context measures, or firms that demon-
 strated the ability to yield returns better than the security benchmark returns
 during the designated context period. The low-performing third consisted of
 firms with strongly negative context measures. In order to maximize con-
 trast, we excluded the middle third from this investigation but included it in
 the regression analysis. We then calculated a mean measure of excess returns
 for each of the four possible contingencies that come from the intersection of
 the two origin and context classifications. Finally, separate two-tailed t-tests
 of mean differences were used to statistically compare investors' reactions to
 insider and outsider appointments to each of the two presuccession con-
 texts.
 RESULTS
 Of the 477 succession cases analyzed, 305 firms (65 percent) performed
 less well than firms with similar risk during the designated context period.
 Inside appointments were involved in 423 firms. The low percentage of
 outside appointments (11.3%) is consistent with the findings of other suc-
 cession studies in large corporations. For example, Beatty and Zajac (1987)
 found the incidence of outsiders to be 12 percent and Friedman and Singh
 (1987) found it to be 15 percent. Also, Furtado and Rozeff (1987) found that
 as firm size increased, the incidence of outsiders decreased.
 Finally, the current data are heavily biased toward largeness. The mean
 equity market capitalization is $1,825 million, with a minimum of $17 mil-
 lion (Allied Supermarket in 1975) and a maximum of $46,792 million (IBM
 in 1982). The firms are therefore considerably larger than the typical large
 firm in Reinganum's (1985) sample, which had a median market value of
 $280 million. Finally, only 21 firms (4.4%) in the current sample had market
 values below $65.5 million, the size used by Reinganum to separate large
 firms from small ones.
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 In sum, the high incidence of poor performance before changing CEO,
 the low incidence of outside appointments, and the overall largeness sug-
 gests that the set of firms collected in the present study adequately repre-
 sents the population of large industrial organizations at a time when they
 change their CEOs.
 Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
 of all variables. Table 2 summarizes the results for the 51-day preannounce-
 ment period (t - 50, t = 0), the 50-day post-announcement period (t + 1,
 t + 50), and the 101-day cumulative succession period (t - 50, t + 50).
 Similarly, Table 3 summarizes the results of the multiple regression equa-
 tion performed on excess returns during the 2-day announcement period
 (t - 1, t + 0) and the 200-day long-term leadership period (t + 100, t + 50).
 Overall, investors are not indifferent about changes in leadership.
 Rather, the means in Table 1 shows that investors, on the average, revise
 downward their earnings expectations, driving down a firm's stock price an
 average 1 percent during the preannouncement period (p < .01) and an
 additional 3.5 percent during the 50-day post-announcement period (p <
 .01). These findings suggest that investors do not view CEO succession as
 unimportant or as an exercise in ritual scapegoating (Gamson & Scotch,
 1964). Further, they suggest that investors do not generally hold an overly
 "romanticized view of leadership" (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). To
 the contrary, investors appear skeptical about the alleged positive intentions
 that motivate succession decisions. However, as predicted, the conse-
 quences of succession for performance depend on the conditions surround-
 ing the event.
 The hypothesis about context (Hypothesis 1) received partial support.
 As expected, the performance of a firm during the time preceding a succes-
 sion event influences investors' assessment of executive changes, at least
 during the 51-day presuccession horizon, as reported in Table 2. During this
 presuccession period, the influence of context on excess returns is positive
 and significant (p < .05), indicating that the better firms perform before
 changing CEOs, the more favorably predisposed investors are to a change.
 However, context as an independent factor does not appear to have an im-
 portant bearing on investors' expectations during the 50-day post-succession
 period (Table 2) and the 2-day announcement period (Table 3), suggesting
 that the information value of context as it relates to a succession event is
 fully discounted by the time an event occurs. Finally, context again appears
 to influence investors' expectations during the 200-day post-succession pe-
 riod, although the causation is weak (p < .10) and inverse (Table 3). We
 posited that during this stewardship period, investors base their expecta-
 tions on their assessment of a leader's initial strategic and operational deci-
 sions rather than on the effects of succession per se.
 The results also indicate partial support for the hypothesis about origin
 (Hypothesis 2). In the case of outside appointments, origin appears to have
 positive and significant effects on investors' expectations for all time frames
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 TABLE 1
 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for All Variablesa
 Variables' Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 1. Context - 0.07** 0.25
 2. Origin 0.11** 0.31 -.06
 3. Interaction term -0.01** 0.11 .42** .15**
 4. Logarithm of size 6.13** 3.43 -.05 -.13** .07
 5. Daily excess returns (-1, 0) 0.00 0.04 -.00 .08* .04 -.03
 6. Daily excess returns (-50, 0) -0.01** 0.12 .12** .04 .07 .03
 7. Daily excess returns (1, 50) -0.03** 0.13 .07 .09* .09* .02
 8. Daily excess returns (-50, +50) -0.04** 0.17 .14** .09* .12** .04
 9. Daily excess returns (100, 300) -0.05** 0.24 -.09* .10*'* -.08* .02
 I
 OIQ
 .21** Q
 .00 -.09*
 .15** .65** .70**
 .02 -.01 .11** -.01
 aN = 477
 b Daily excess returns are cumulated over the time frame indicated within the parentheses.
 tp < .10
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
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 TABLE 2
 Results of Multiple Regression of Succession for Three Time Horizons
 51-day 50-day 101-day
 Presuccession Post-succession Cumulative
 Perioda Periodb Intervalc
 Standard Standard Standard
 Variables Betas Errors Betas Errors Betas Errors
 Intercept -.004 .015 - .022 .015 - .027 .020
 Context .057* .025 - .005 .024 .052 .033
 Origind .029 .019 .055** .019 .084** .025
 Interaction of
 context and
 origin .025 .060 .156** .058 .181* .078
 Size .000 .002 - .002 .002 - .002 .003
 F4,472 2.31* 3.76** 5.42**
 R2 .02 .03 .04
 a Period defined as t - 50, t = 0
 b Period defined as t + 1, t + 50
 c Period defined as t - 50, t + 50
 d Origin is a dichotomous dummy variable with 0 = inside successor, 1 = outside suc-
 cessor.
 tp < .10
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 except the 51-day presuccession period. The findings, therefore, clearly sug-
 gest that investors view an outside appointment as having a more favorable
 impact on earnings than an inside appointment. Further, the origin findings
 are noticeably different from the context findings regarding when each in-
 fluences investors' expectations: investors appear to be more concerned with
 the context of succession events before CEO changes and more concerned
 with the origin of new leaders after the changes. Apparently, investors have
 no accurate knowledge of information embedded in the broad origin mea-
 sure on the likelihood of strategy, policy, and administration changes until
 after a successor is announced.
 Perhaps the most interesting results come from testing Hypothesis 3.
 During the 50-day post-succession period, the time after investors have dis-
 counted the effects of context, new information, such as origin and origin in
 light of context, appears to influence investors, as shown by a positive in-
 teraction term (p < .01). Similarly, the 101-day cumulative period also re-
 veals a positive and significant interaction term (p < .02).
 Finally, the regression model as a whole does not explain much vari-
 ance in excess returns, as evidenced by the low R2 statistics. However, the
 F-statistics reveal that the model does account for significant variance in
 excess returns for all but the 2-day announcement period. A significant F
 suggests that at least one hypothesized relationship is not equal to zero.
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 TABLE 3
 Results of Multiple Regression of Succession for Two Time Horizons
 2-day 200-day
 Succession Perioda Leadership Periodb
 Standard Standard
 Variables Betas Errors Betas Errors
 Intercept - .001 .004 -.041 .029
 Context -.004 .007 -.083t .048
 Originc .012* .006 .068t .037
 Interaction of context and origin .025 .017 -.022 .115
 Size - .000 .001 - .004 .004
 F4.472 1.52 2.48**
 R2 .01 .02
 aDefined as t - 1, t = 0.
 bDefined as t + 100, t + 300.
 c Origin is a dichotomous dummy variable with 0 = inside successor, 1 = outside succes-
 sor.
 tp < .10
 * p < .05
 **p < .01
 Further, the importance of each independent variable changes over the dif-
 ferent time horizons. These findings support the contention, raised in man-
 agement journals, that research needs to assess investors' reactions to cor-
 porate events over a number of pre- and post-event time periods.
 It is also important to note that the multiple regression model includes
 size as an independent variable, and in no case does size emerge as an
 important explanatory variable. Further, size is significantly correlated with
 origin, although the correlation, as reported in Table 1, is small (- .13). The
 low magnitude of correlation suggests that any distortions in the regression
 coefficients due to multicollinearity were minor. The explanation for finding
 no size effect may lie in the construction of both the data set and the excess
 returns measure. Recall that the data set only consists of large firms and that
 the returns measure uses a control that minimizes extraneous influences on
 stock returns like size.
 Table 4 presents two contingency matrixes to help clarify the form of the
 significant interaction terms and in the process provide additional insight as
 to the two contingent relationships predicted by the third hypothesis.
 Regarding the first contingent relationship, investors seem indifferent to
 origin when succession occurs in low-performing firms. Whether leaders are
 appointed from inside or outside an organization, the values of these low-
 performing firms drop an additional 4 percent during the 50-day post-
 succession time frame and about 6 percent overall for the 101-day cumula-
 tive time frame, suggesting that investors are generally pessimistic about the
 ability of a new leader to reverse a firm's behavior. The findings on insiders
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 TABLE 4
 Contingency Matrixes: Mean Excess Returns by Origin and Contexta'b
 (a) 50-day Post-succession Period
 Performance Context
 Origin High Low
 Insiders -.038 (.123) -.042 (.154)
 144 131
 Outsiders .021 (.133) -.038 (.200)
 17 23
 Mean difference 1.85t 0.11
 (b) 101-day Cumulative Interval
 Performance Context
 Origin High Low
 Insiders -.036 (.160) -.056 (.183)
 144 131
 Outsiders .071 (.250) -.057 (.249)
 17 23
 Mean difference 2.53** 0.02
 a In each cell, the first number is the mean excess return expressed as a decimal. The
 number in parentheses is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the mean. The bottom num-
 ber is the number of observations for that cell.
 b Overall, during the designated 200-trading-day period, firms in the high performance
 succession context (the top thirtile) had a mean excess return and standard deviation of 0.204
 (.175) and the low performing firms (bottom thirtile) had -0.324 (.139). To maximize contrast,
 we excluded 162 midrange performers from this investigation but included them in the regres-
 sion analysis. Overall, the midrange performers had a mean excess return and standard devi-
 ation of -0.083 (.057).
 t p < .10
 ** p < .01
 are therefore consistent with the third hypothesis, but the findings on out-
 siders are not. We predicted that outsiders will be more able to turn low
 performers around than insiders would be.
 Regarding the second contingent relationship predicted by the third
 hypothesis, the results suggest that good presuccession performance ampli-
 fies investors' positive evaluation of an outside appointment. The value of
 these firms' stock increased an average 7 percent during the 101-day suc-
 cession interval, a mean return significantly larger ( p < .01) than the 3.5
 percent decline observed for inside appointments in the same performance
 context. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction that outsiders will
 be less able than insiders to maintain high performance.
 DISCUSSION
 This study showed that investors typically seem to revise their expec-
 tations of cash flows downward during the time surrounding a succession
 announcement. However, not all appointment announcements convey neg-
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 ative information. For example, investors appear to react favorably to an-
 nouncements when the two independent factors-high performance and
 outside appointment-coincide.
 Since the results for outside appointments in high-performance settings
 departed from expectations, some reconciliation with prevailing theory is in
 order. Fundamental to the second and third hypotheses is the assumption
 that outsiders have a disruptive influence on organizations because they are
 less committed to the organizations' strategies, values, and people than are
 insiders. Perhaps, contrary to expectations, high-performing firms are more
 receptive to hiring from the outside because the security and status of ex-
 isting managers are relatively secure during periods of prosperity. As Hel-
 mich (1975) stated, successful groups may perceive a new successor as a
 force that will stimulate change and reinforce positive behaviors. This is not
 to say that capable insiders could not be as effective, but rather that the pool
 of all available candidates may be larger for high-performing firms. More-
 over, perhaps investors interpret the appointment of an outsider to a high-
 performing firm as a signal of the firm's intention to remain adaptive. Per-
 haps investors expect outsiders to serve investors' interests more than en-
 trenched insiders. These explanations are generally consistent with those in
 a recent Hay Group Incorporated study reported in Business Week (1986). Its
 major finding was that many firms, including companies that are growing,
 benefit by putting outsiders in key positions.
 The annoucement of an inside appointment in the high-performance
 context may not convey the same adaptive message. Rather, an inside ap-
 pointment may signal the continuation of the previous administration's
 mind set. Although that is not necessarily bad, organizational studies have
 shown that when success breeds pervasive continuity, political obstacles to
 reorientation grow.
 The result for outside appointments in low-performance contexts is also
 interesting because it suggests that although the appointment of an outsider
 may be an essential ingredient for turnaround, it may not be sufficient.
 Perhaps an outsider brought into a low-performance context with the task of
 turning a company around will have a great disruptive effect. One reviewer
 of the present research pointed out, however, that the level of disruption
 may have more to do with the expectations the members of a firm hold
 regarding the origin of the successor than the origin per se. For example,
 Gouldner (1954) found outsiders to have a disruptive influence, but Guest
 (1962) did not. However, the gypsum mine workers in Gouldner's study
 were accustomed to inside successors, and the employees at the automobile
 plant in Guest's study were expecting an outside successor. A second re-
 viewer suggested caution when comparing leadership succession among in-
 dustrial workers with executive succession at large corporations.
 Perhaps, in a competitive market for management talent, low-
 performing firms are unable to attract the best available managers (Pfeffer &
 Davis-Blake, 1986). Or perhaps such firms, faced with dwindling resources,
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 deteriorating morale, and competitive disadvantages in their current product
 markets, tend to continue to decline in spite of a leadership change. What-
 ever the explanation, one point is clear: succession-induced turnarounds
 such as Chrysler Corporation's may be the exception. As Hambrick and
 Schecter noted: "There is an abundant folklore on how to revive poorly
 performing businesses, but systematic evidence about turnaround is scant"
 (1983: 231).
 The overall evidence suggesting that investors view outside successors
 more favorably than insiders is puzzling, given the dearth of outside ap-
 pointments. Recall that investors reacted favorably to outside appointments
 at the time of announcements (the two-day succession effect). Further, they
 continued to revise their expectations significantly upward during the post-
 succession period and the long-term leadership period. In light of these
 findings, why are insiders favored by a margin of nine to one?
 Other questions emerge from the findings of this study. What motivates
 a high-performing firm to change leaders? Are low-performing firms openly
 aware of their poor performance? Do investors react more favorably to firms
 in which the transition between top managers is orderly and to firms that
 disclose the true reasons for a change in CEO? These questions call for
 additional investigations of succession events.
 Finally, this study has implications for traditional event-study method-
 ology and for the conclusions of succession studies that have used such
 methodology. First, we introduced a measure of security benchmark returns
 that retains the advantages of stock-price measures and overcomes their
 principal limitations. Second, this study investigated investor reactions to
 succession announcements over various horizons preceding and following
 the events and found that the results of the regression model were significant
 for all but the two-day announcement period. Further, this study found that
 each explanatory factor is important during a different horizon. The contrast
 in findings for the two-day announcement period and the longer horizons
 suggests that studies that rely on short horizons immediately surrounding an
 event may not accurately capture succession-related returns. This observa-
 tion does not call into question the efficiency of capital markets but suggests
 that investors cannot make final judgments on what they do not yet know
 with certainty. Since all recent empirical investigations of succession in
 large organizations have used a potentially biased measure of performance,
 and most have used short horizons, it is not surprising that a consistent set
 of findings about whether a new leader can alter corporate performance has
 not emerged.
 CONCLUSIONS
 This study has shown that the performance context of a succession
 event and the origin of a newly appointed leader moderate the relationship
 between the succession and its consequences for performance in large cor-
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 porations. In general, succession conveys negative information to investors.
 However, they seem to revise their expectations of cash flows upward when
 outsiders are appointed to high-performing firms.
 The study has limitations that temper the strength of its findings. It
 focused on one background factor and one dimension of organizational con-
 text while controlling for size. We did not control for the multitude of other
 possible background and context factors but assumed their influence would
 be random. A recent study by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), however, found
 that stock prices predicted CEO succession only when a predecessor was
 less than 63 years old. Another limitation of the present study is that it used
 chief executives as the units of analysis. Although it is true in most firms that
 the chief executive exerts the most power of any manager, Hambrick and
 Mason (1984) asserted that studying entire management teams may increase
 the predictive strength of a model. Finally, the study followed a stringent
 decision rule when defining origin. Vancil (1987) suggested a less stringent
 rule, whereby appointees with one to five years of tenure in an organization
 were considered outsiders.
 Clearly, there are opportunities for future research. Nonetheless, empir-
 ical analysis of premises concerning executive background characteristics,
 organizational context, and corporate size have been long overdue, and the
 current study made an attempt to test some of those premises.
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 APPENDIX
 Derivation of Betaa
 Beta (ret,t mret3t)- (N) ( retit) ( mret3t)
 t V / \ t t
 - (mrett mret3t) - () ( mrett) ( mrt3t
 t W \t / \t /
 where
 reti,t = log of (1 + return for security i on day t),
 mrett = log of (1 + value-weighted market return on day t),
 mret3t = (mrett_1 + mrett + mrett+1) - 3,b and
 N = the number of observations for the year.
 a See the CRSP Daily Excess Returns File for additional detail.
 b This is a three-day moving-average market window.
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